

REPORTS

CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED

THE SUPREME COURT

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By THOMAS CURRY,

Counsellor at Law,

AND REPORTER OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.

VOLUME XVI.



NEW-ORLEANS:

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1841

During the time embraced by this volume, the court consisted of the following judges:

Honorable FRANÇOIS X. MARTIN, "HENRY A. BULLARD,

- ALONZO MORPHY,
- EDWARD SIMON,
- RICE GARLAND.

CHRONOLOGICAL

TABLE OF CASES.

WESTERN DISTRICT,

OPELOUSAS, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1840.

	PAGE
Lambert vs. Franchebois et al.,	1
Wilcoxon vs. Rogers et ux.,	6
Gary vs. Sandoz,	11
Taylor vs. Andrus	15
Foreman vs. Wikoff,	20
Brent, Agent, &c. vs. Cheevers,	23
Harman vs. M'Leland,	26
Arden vs. Soileau,-	28
Connelly vs. Cheevers,	30
M'Casken vs. Smith,	32
Miles vs. His Creditors,	35
Thibodeaux's Heirs vs. Thibodeaux,	40
Kemper's Heirs vs. Hulick,	44
Gillet et al. vs. Theall,	46
Walker et al. vs. Martolo,	50
Dupre vs. Splane,	51
Martin et al. vs. Patin et al.,	55
Lesesne & Edmondson vs. Cook,	58
Segur vs. Pellerin,	63
Parker vs. Brashear & Barr,	69
Parmele & Baker vs. Brashear,	72
Collins vs. Moore & Prescott,	75
Williams vs. Brashear,	
Le Blanc vs. Baras's Heirs;	80
Marsh & Miller vs. Gonsoulin,	84
Breau vs. Landry et al.,	88
Delahoussaye vs. Dumartrait,	91

CHRONOLOGICAL

	LYGE
O'Brien's Heirs vs. Smith,	94
Peuch, Bien & Co. vs. Palfrey, Syndic, &c., and Saunders	97
Compton vs. Palfrey, Syndic, &c., and Saunders,	99
M'Millin vs. Carlin, Curator, &c.,	100
Stein vs. Gibbons & Irby,	103
Cox vs. Rees et al.,	109
Mouton vs. Droz,	111
Linton's Heirs vs. Walsh,	113
Loussade vs. Hartman et al.,	117
Le Blanc vs. His Creditors,	120
Carriere & Borduzat vs. Meyer et al.,	126
Cook vs. Parkarson,	129
Mouton, Agent, &c. vs. Thibodeaux,	131
Boutte, f. m. c. vs. Martin et al.,	133
Le Blanc vs. Broussard's Heirs,	137
Walton & Son vs. Bemiss et al.,	140
Dwight & Hartman vs. Bemiss et al.,	145
Melançon's Heirs vs. Robechaud's Heirs,	
Guidry vs. Guidry's Heirs,	157
WESTERN DISTRICT,	
ALEXANDRIA, OCTOBER TERM, 1840.	
Pepper et al. vs. Dunlap,	163
Slocumb et al. vs. Robert,	
Cuny vs. Robert et al.,	175
Red River Rail Road Co. vs. Williams,	182
Phelps vs. Wilson,	185
Welch & Co. vs. Thorn et al.,	188
Tompkins et ux. vs. Benjamin, Tutor, &c	197
Graham's Heirs vs. Graham's Administrator,	201
Fenner vs. Watkins et al.,	204
Maurin vs. Chambers & Williams,	207
Maurin vs. Chambers,	212
	213
	219
•	223


	PAGE
Strong vs. Rachal et al.,	232
Union Bank vs. Williams et al.,	236
Brown vs. Gunning's Curatrix et al.,	238
Hood vs. M'Corkle,	240
Hoover, Tutor, &c. vs. Glasscock,	242
Lott & Ives vs. Parham,	245
Lynch et al. vs. Brewer,	247
Mahle vs. Terry	248
Coleman et al. vs. Flint,	250
Boler vs. Day,	251
Harrod vs. Voorhies's Administratrix	254
Amado vs. Breda,	257
Metoyer vs. Larenaudiere,	
Manice vs. Long,	263
Ardry's Wife vs. Ardry her Husband: Kain & Co. et al., Inter-	
venors,	264
Delininico & Co. vs. Terry,	269
Flores vs. Lemee, Administrator, &c.,	271
Tompkins vs. Stroud et al.,	274
Maurin & Co. vs. Perot,	276
Kirkby's Heirs vs. Fogleman,	277
Harrison vs. Bowen,	282
State of Louisiana vs. Cook,	287
Cook vs. State of Louisiana,	288
Taylor et al. vs. Crain's Administrator,	290
Griffing's Administratrix vs. Caldwell et al.,	294
Brander et al. vs. Ferriday, Bennett & Co.,	296
Blackwell et al. vs. Griffin,	301
Wetmore & Co. vs. Hunter et al.,	302
Stebbins et al. vs. Coley,	303
Wilkinson et al. vs. Phelps,	304
Nott's Executors vs. Beard,	308
Bryan's Administrator vs. Spruell,	313
Lambeth et al. vs. Petrovic,	315
Windle vs. Flint,	319
Fulton vs. Gorton's Executor,	320
Gordon vs Nelson	321

CHRONOLOGICAL

	PAGE
Filhiol's Heirs vs. Hempkin, Administrator,	
Armor vs. Lewis,	331
Brazeale & Sewell vs. Bordelon, Administrator, &c., et al.,	333
Nelson vs. Lillard,	336
Brumgard vs. Anderson,	341
Brown's Executor vs. Garret et al.,	344
Lambeth & Thompson vs. Dosson & Lovelace,	346
Sexton et ux. vs. Brock,	347
Campbell vs. His Creditors,	348
Bray's Executrix vs. Bray,	352
Harrison vs. Faulk,	358
Hempkin vs. Bowmar et al.,	363
Brander et al. vs. Bowmar & Abercrombie,	370
Montelius & Fuller vs. Cloman & Harrell,	375
Copley vs. Flint & Cox,	380
Miller vs. Holstein,	389
Same vs. Same,	
Pearce et al. vs. Frantum,	414
Same vs. Same, On a Rehearing,	423
Brosnaham et al. vs. Turner,	433
Same vs, Same, On a Rehearing,	442
EASTERN DISTRICT,	
DECEMBER TERM, 1840.	
Merchant's Bank of New-York vs. Exchange Bank of New-	
Orleans,	
Deyraud vs. Banks,	461
Shields et al. vs. Perry, M'Clure et al.,	
Bourgeat vs. Smith's Syndics,	
Delavigne, Syndic vs. City Bank of New-Orleans,	471
Bonnemer vs. Negretc,	
Legendre vs. Woodrooff,	
M'Mahan vs. Grant & Turnell,	
Elizabeth Thomas, f. w. c. vs. Generis et al.,	
Carrollton Bank vs. Tayleur et al.,	490

TABLE OF CASES.	VII
Rightor vs. Kohn et al.,	7443 501
Livaudais vs. Municipality No. 2,	
Heath & Co. vs. Vaught et al.: Dougherty & Co., Intervenors,	
Kirkman et al. vs. Hills,	
Lallande vs. M'Master,	
Municipality No. 2 vs. M'Donough,	
Bank of Illinois vs. Sloo & Byrne et al.,	
Same vs. Same, On an application for a Rehearing,	
Fink vs. Lallande et al.,	
Patterson vs. Garrison,	557
Hart & Merritt vs. Dahlgreen & Co.,	559
Latour vs. Bellow,	562
Wagner et al. vs. Hall,	563
Gollain vs. Jamet	565
M'Cullock vs. Commercial Bank,	
Opdyke vs. Corles,	569
Pilie vs. Kenner,	570
Lambeth & Thompson vs. Rivarde et al.,	572
Clarke et al. vs. Morse,	575
Lizardi et al. vs. Arthur & Fulton,	577
Reed et al. vs. Wright,	580
Hebert, Treasurer, &c. vs. Maillan, et al.,	585
City Council of Plaquemine vs. Decaudine,	588
Cordeville & Lacroix vs. Hosmer,	590
Sparks vs. Weatherby,	594
Nolson etc. Rotte	506

V.



ALPHABETICAL

TABLE OF CASES.

Amado vs. Breda	257
Anderson vs. Brumgard	
Andrus ads. Taylor,	15
Arden vs. Soileau,	28
Ardry's wife vs. Ardry, Her Husband et al.,	264
Armor vs. Lewis,	331
Arthur & Fulton ads. Lizardi et al.,	577
Bailey ads. Huie,	213
Bank of Illinois vs. Sloo & Byrne et al.,	539
Same vs. same, on application for rehearing,	544
Banks vs. Deyraud,	461
Baras's Heirs ads. Le Blanc	80
Beard vs. Non's Executor,	308
Bemiss et al. ads. Walton,	140
Same ads. Dwight & Hartman,	145
Bellow ads. Latour,	562
Benjamin, Tutor &c. ads. Tompkins et ux	197
Blackwell et al. vs. Griffin,	
Boler vs. Day,	251
Bonnemer vs. Negrete,	474
Bordelon, Administrator, &c. ads. Brazeale & Sewell,	333
Bourgeat vs. Smith's Syndics,	467
Boutté, f. m. c. vs. Martin et al	133
Bowen ads. Harrison,	
Bowmar et al. ads. Hempkin,	36 3
Bowmar and Abercrombie ads. Brander et al.,	370
Brander et al. vs. Ferriday, Bennett & Co.,	296
Same vs. Bowmar and Abercrombie,	370
Brashear ads. Williams,	77
Same ads Parmele & Baker,	72
Brashear & Barr's Heirs ads. Parker,	69
Bray's Executrix vs. Bray,	352
B VOL. XVI.	

	1 A
Brazeale & Sewell vs. Bordelon, Administrator, &c.,	333
Breau vs. Landry et al	88
Breda ads. Amado,	257
Brent, Agent, &c. vs. Cheevers.	23
Brewer ads. Lynch et al.,	247
Brock ads. Sexton et al.,	347
Brosnaham et al vs. Turner,	433
Same vs. Same, on a rehearing,	442
Dioubbands field was, no Banc,	137
Brown vs. Gunning's Curatrix et al.,	238
Brown's Executor vs Garrett et al.,	
Brumgard vs. Anderson,	341
Bryan's Administrator vs. Spruell,	313
Caldwell et al. ads. Griffing's Administrator,	294
Campbell vs. His Creditors,	348
Carlin, Curator, &c. ads. M'Millin,	100
Carrollton Bank vs. Tayleur et al.,	490
Carriere & Borduzat vs Meyer et al.,	126
Chambers & Williams ads. Maurin,	207
Chambers ads. Same,	212
Cheevers ads. Brent, Agent, &c.,	23
Same ads. Connelly,	30
City Bank of New Orleans ads. Dalavigne, Syndic, &c,,	471
City Council of Plaquemine vs Decaudine et al.,	588
Clarke et al. vs. Morse,	575
Cloman & Harrell ads. Montelius & Fuller,	375
Coleman et al. vs. Flint,	250
Coley ads. Stebbins et al.,	303
Collins vs. Moore & Prescott,	75
Compton vs. Palfrey, Syndic, &c. and Saunders,	99
Commercial Bank ads. M'Cullock,	566
Connelly vs. Cheevers,	30
Cooke ads. Lesesne & Edmondson,	58
Same vs. Parkerson,	129
Same vs. State of Louisiana,	
Same ads. Same,	
Copley vs. Flint & Cox,	
Cordeville & Lacroix vs. Hosmer,	590
Corles ads. Opdyke.	569

•	PAGE
Cox rs. Rees et al.,	109
Crain's Administrator ads. Taylor et al.,	290
Creditors ads. Miles,	35
Same ads. Le Blanc,	120
Same ads. Campbell,	348
Cuny vs. Robert et al.,	175
Dahlgreen & Co. ads. Hart & Merritt.	559
Day ads. Boler,	251
Decaudine et al. ads. City Council of Plaquemine,	583
Delahoussaye rs. Dumartrait,	91
Dalavigne, Syndic, &c. rs. City Bank of New Orleans,	471
Delininico & Co. vs. Terry,	269
Deyraud vs. Banks,	461
Dosson & Lovelace ads. Lambeth & Thompson,	346
Droz ads. Mouton,	111
Dumartrait ads. Delahoussaye,	91
Dunlap ads. Pepper et al.,	163
Dupre vs. Splane,	51
Dwight & Hartman vs. Bemiss et al.,	140
Elizabeth Thomas, f. w. c. vs. Generis et al.,	483
Exchange Bank of New-Orleans ads. Merchants Bank of New-	
York,	457
Faulk ads. Harrison,	358
·	201
Ferriday Bennett & Co. ads. Brander et al.,	
Filhiol's Heirs vs. Hempkin, Administrator,	
Fink vs. Lallande et al.	
Flint & Cox ads. Copley,	
Flint ads. Coleman et al.,	
Same ads. Windle,	
Flores vs. Lemee, Administrator, &c.,	
Fogleman ads. Kirkby's Heirs,	
Foreman vs. Wikoff,	20
Franchebois et al. ads. Lambert,	1
Frantum ads. Pearce et al.,	414
Same ads. Same, on a rehearing,	423
Fulton vs. Gorton's Executor,	320
Carrett et al ade Brown's Executor	344

•	PAGE
Garrison ads. Patterson,	
Gary vs. Sandoz,	
Generis et al. ads. Elizabeth Thomas, f. w. c.,	
Gibbons and Irby ads. Stein,	
Gillet et al. vs. Theall,	
Glasscock ads. Hoover, Tutor, &c.,	
Gollain vs. Jamet,	
Gonsoulin ads. Marsh & Miller,	
Gordon vs. Wells,	
Same vs. Nelson,	336
Gorton's Executor ads. Fulton,	
Graham's Heirs vs. Graham's Administrator,	
Grant and Turnell ads. M'Mahan,	
Griffin ads. Blackwell,	
Griffing's Administrator vs. Caldwell et al.,	
Guidry vs. Guidry's Heirs,	
Gunning's Curatrix et al. ads. Brown,	238
Hall ads. Wagner et al.,	
Harman vs. M'Lelland,	
Harrison vs. Bowen,	
Same vs. Faulk,	
Harrod vs. Voorhies's Administratrix,	254
Hart & Merritt vs. Dahlgreen & Co.,	559
Hartman et al. ads. Loussade,	
Heath & Co. vs. Vaught et al., &c.,	
Hebert, Treasurer, &c. vs. Maillan et al.,	
Hempkin vs. Bowmar et al.,	
Hempkin, Administrator ads. Filhiol's Heirs,	
Hills ads. Kirkman et al.,	
Holstein ads. Miller,	
Same ads. Same, on a rehearing,	395
Hood vs. M'Corkle,	240
Hoover, Tutor, &c. vs. Glasscock,	
Hosmer ads. Cordeville & Lacroix,	590
Huie vs. Bailey,	213
Hulick ads. Kemper's Heirs,	44
Hunter et al. ads. Wetmore et al.,	302
Hyde et al. ads. Petrovic,	223
Jamet ads Gollain	565
INTITEL INTO CONTRACTOR	2011/20

TABLE OF CASES.	XIII
Kemper's Heirs vs. Hulick,	PAGE
Kenner ads. Pilie,	570
Kirkby's Heirs vs. Fogleman,	
Kirkman et al. vs. Hills,	
Kohn et al. ads. Rightor,	
Lallande vs. M'Master,	
Lallande et al. ads. Fink,	577
Lambert vs. Franchebois et al.,	1
Lambeth et al. vs. Petrovic,	
Lambeth & Thompson vs. Dosson & Lovelace,	
Same vs. Rivarde et al.,	572
Landry et al. ads. Breau,	88
Laurenaudiere ads. Metoyer,	
Latour ads. Bellow,	
Le Blanc vs. Barras's Heirs,	80
Same vs. His Creditors,	
Same vs. Broussard's Heirs,	
Legendre vs. Woodrooff.	
Lemee, Administrator, &c. ads. Flores,	
Lesesne & Edmondson vs. Cook,	58
Lewis ads. Armor,	331
Lillard ads. Nelson,	336
Linton's Heirs vs. Walsh,	
Livaudais vs. Municipality Number Two,	
Lizardi et al. vs. Arthur & Fulton,	57 7
Long ads. Manice,	
Lott & Ives vs. Parham,	245
Loussade vs. Hartman et al.,	117
Lynch et al. vs. Brewer,	247
Mahle vs. Terry,	248
Maillan et al. ads. Hebert, Treasurer, &c.,	
Manice vs. Long,	
Marsh & Miller vs. Gonsoulin,	
	55
Same ads. Boutté, f. m. c.	
Martolo ads. Walker et al.	
Maurin vs. Chambers & Williams,	
Same vs. Chambers,	
	276

ALPHABETICAL

M'Casken vs. Smith,	32
M'Corkle ads. Hood,	
M'Cullock vs. Commercial Bank,	
M'Donough ads. Municipality Number Two,	
M'Lelland ads. Harman,	
M'Mahan vs. Grant and Turnell,	
M'Master ads. Lallande,	
M'Millin vs. Carlin, Curator, &c.,	
Melançon's Heirs vs. Robechaud's Heirs,	
Merchants' Bank of N. York vs. Exchange Bank of N. Orleans,	457
Metoyer vs. Laurenaudiere,	
Meyer et al. ads. Carriere & Borduzat,	
Miles vs. His Creditors,	35
Miller vs. Holstein,	
Same vs. Same, on a rehearing,	395
Montelius & Fuller vs. Cloman & Harrell,	
Moore & Prescott ads. Collins,	
Morse ads. Clarke et al.,	575
Mouton vs. Droz,	111
Same, Agent, &c. vs. Thibodeaux,	131
Municipality Number Two ads. Livaudais,	509
Same vs. M'Donough,	553
Negrete ads. Bonnemer,	474
Nelson ads. Gordon,	
Same vs. Lillard,	
Same vs. Botts,	
Nott's Executors vs. Beard,	
·	
O'Brien's Heirs vs. Smith,	94
Opdyke vs. Corles,	569
Palfrey, Syndic, &c., and Saunders ads. Peuch Bein, & Co	97
Same ads. Compton,	99
Parham ads. Lott & Ives,	245
Parkarson ads. Cook,	129
Parker vs. Brashear and Barr's Heirs,	69
Parmele & Baker vs. Brashear,	72
Pâtin et al. ads. Martin et al.,	55
Patterson vs. Garrison,	55 7
Pearce et al. vs. Frantum,	414
Same vs. Same on a rehearing.	423

TABLE OF CASES.	x v
, , , , ,	AG R
Pellerin ads. Segur,	63
cpper et al. et. Daniap,	163
Citt was: Madim to Conjection of the Conjection	276
, ,	463
Petrovic vs. Hyde et al.,	
Same ads. Lambeth & Thompson,	
2 00001, 25001 62 001 2 01110, 251100, 6201, 6201	97
Phelps ads. Wilson,	
Same vs. Wilkinson et al.,	
Pilie vs. Kenner,	570
Rachal et al. ads. Strong,	232
Red River Rail-Road Company vs. Williams,	
Reed et al. vs. Wright,	
Rees et al. ads. Cox,	
Rightor vs. Kohn et al.,	
Rivarde et al. ads. Lambeth & Thompson,	
Robechaud's Heirs ads. Melançon's Heirs,	
Robert ads. Slocomb et al.,	
Robert et al. ads. Cuny,	
•	6
Sandoz vs. Gary,	11
Segur vs. Pellerin.	63
Sexton et ux. vs. Brock,	
Shields et al. vs. Perry, M'Clure et al.,	
Slocomb et al., vs. Robert,	
Sloo & Byrne et al. ads. Bank of Illinois,	
•	544
	94
Same ads. M'Casken,	
Smith's Syndic ads. Bourgeat,	
Soileau ads. Arden,	
Sparks vs. Weatherby,	
Splane ads. Dupre,	
Spruell ads. Bryan's Administrator,	
State of Louisiana vs. Cook.	

Same,_____ 288

ads.

Same

,	PAGE
Tayleur et al. ads. Carrollton Bank,	490
Taylor vs. Andrus,	15
Taylor et al. vs. Crain's Administrator,	290
Terry ads. Mahle,	248
Same ads. Delininico & Co.,	269
Theall ads. Gillet et al.,	46
Thibodeaux ads. Thibodeaux's Heirs,	40
Same ads. Mouton, Agent, &c.,	131
Thorn et al. ads. Welch & Co.,	188
Tompkins et ux. vs. Benjamin, Tutor, &c.,	197
Same vs. Stroud et al.,	274
Turner ads. Brosnaham et al.,	433
Same ads. Same, on a rehearing,	442
Union Bank vs. Williams et al.,	236
Vaught et al.: Dougherty & Co., Intervenors ads. Heath & Co., .	515
Voorhees's Administratrix ads. Harrod.,	254
Wagner et al. vs. Hall,	563
Walker et al. vs. Martolo,	50
Walsh vs. Linton's Heirs,	113
Watkins et al. ads. Fenner,	204
Walton & Son vs. Bemiss et al.,	113
Weatherby ads. Sparks,	594
Welch & Co. vs. Thorn et al.,	188
Wells ads. Gordon	219
Wetmore & Co. vs. Hunter et al.,	302
Wikoff ads. Foreman,	20
Wilcoxon vs. Rogers et ux.,	6
Wilkinson et al. vs. Phelps,	304
Williams ads. Red River Rail Road Co.	182
Same vs. Brashear,	77
Same et al. ads. Union Bank,	236
Wilson ads. Phelps,	185
Windle vs. Flint.	319
Woodrooff ads. Legendre,	477
Wright ads. Reed et al	

REPORTS

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CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED

IN

THE SUPREME COURT

0 F

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

WESTERN DISTRICT.
OPELOUSAS, SEPTEMBER, 1840.

LAMBERT US. FRANCHEBOIS ET AL.#

WESTERN DIST. September, 1840.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF THE FIFTH DISTRICT, FOR THE PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, JUDGE BOYCE OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT PRESIDING.

LAMBERT TO. FRANCERBOIS BY AL.

The paraphernal property of married women is not bound for the debts contracted by the husband while at the head of the community: neither are the fruits liable, when the wife administers her own property.

- A sale by the husband to the wife, when made for replacing her dotal and paraphernal property or effects, is valid in law, particularly when no fraud and collusion is alleged.
- A sale from husband to the wife, for replacing her dotal and paraphernal effects, should not be attacked, unless on the ground of fraud and collusion.

This is an injunction to stay a seizure under execution. The sheriff seized under execution, which issued on a

VOL. XVI.

^{*} Judge Garland did not sit in the first sixteen cases in the Western District, at Opelousas. He was sworn in and took his seat on the 23d September, 1840. On that day, Judge Simon withdrew for the remainder of the term at Opelousas, having been counsel in all the other causes which were tried. Judge Bullard did not get to Opelousas this term, being detained in travelling; but went on to Alexandria, and met the court there.

Eastern Dist. December, 1840.

CARROLLTON BANK US. TAYLEUR ET AL.

CARROLLTON
BANK
TO.
TAYLEUR BT AL

ROM THE PARISH COURTJOR THE PARISH AND CITY OF NEW-ORLEARS.

16L 490 49 1048

- A promise to accept, contemplates a specific bill or bills, whether drawn or to be drawn, and not a general authority to draw to a certain amount, without any description of the bills. In the latter case it will not be such an implied acceptance or promise to accept, as will bind the drawes.
- So, a letter of credit, within a reasonable time before or after the date of the bill, describing and promising to accept it, if shown to a person who takes the bill on the faith of the letter, is a virtual acceptance.
- But where bills are drawn and sold to a third person, on a letter of the drawer, written to the drawer, allowing the latter a limited credit, available on certain conditions, the drawee is under no obligation, express or implied, to the holders to accept the bills.
- Letters of credit should be addressed to the persons who advance the funds, or buy the bills drawn under it; and then they become the mandatories of the drawee or writer, and have nothing to do with the equities or relations between the drawer and drawee.

This is an action to recover the balance due on four bills of Exchange, with interest, damages and costs, drawn by James Grimshaw, of New-Orleans, in March and April, 1839, on the defendants, Charles Tayleur, Son & Co., merchants in Liverpool, payable in London, 60 days after sight, which were refused acceptance and protested for non-pay-The plaintiffs show that they were the purchasers and are the holders of said bills, which they took from James Grimshaw, the drawer thereof, on the faith of a letter of credit, written by said Tayleur, Sons & Co., dated at Liverpool, the 7th December, 1838, addressed to said Grimshaw, "giving him an open credit for ten thousand pounds sterling," on which he was authorized to draw, and they were bound to pay his drafts so drawn; that on exhibiting this letter, and depositing it with the plaintiffs, they were induced to buy said drafts from Grimshaw, and which they consider a virtual acceptance by the defendants, and that they are liable and

bound to pay the same; wherefore, they pray judgment; EASTERN DIST. and that property of the defendants, within the jurisdiction of December, 1840. this court, be attached and made subject to the satisfaction of said judgment.

The defendants admitted they wrote the letter of the TAYLEUR ET AL. date mentioned, addressed to James Grimshaw, giving him an open credit of ten thousand pounds sterling, available as often as his drafts drawn on said credit should be covered by satisfactory remittances in bills, specie or produce, so as they should not at any time be brought under acceptances for more than that sum, and with the understanding that, before or at the close of the season, the probable balance against him They further aver, they have fully should be remitted for. complied with their obligations to Grimshaw, and that at the time when the bills were dishonored, they were already under acceptance for a sum exceeding in amount the sum authorized, and consequently not bound to accept these drafts. They put the plaintiffs on strict proof that they took the bills in question on the faith of the letter of credit, and pray judgment in their behalf.

On these pleadings and issues the cause was tried before the court.

The case mainly turned on the questions: First, whether the defendants were bound to third persons on their letter to Grimshaw, and whether it was not a virtual acceptance of such drafts as he might draw, within the limits and on the conditions prescribed? And second, whether the defendants had not complied and accepted drafts already, to the full amount authorized in said letter?

The parish judge was of opinion, the defendants were not liable as acceptors under the letter of credit, and gave judgment accordingly, from which the plaintiffs appealed.

T. Slidell, for the plaintiffs:

1. A promise to accept amounts to an acceptance. although at one time doubts were raised whether this doctrine applied to bills not in esse at the time of the promise, vet all such doubts have been completely dissipated by a large

EASTERN DIST. train of decisions, both in this country and by the highest December, 1840. tribunals of England. When one merchant makes to another such a promise as enables that party to obtain credit, by exhibiting it upon the exchange, the party promising is not per-FAYERUR BY AL. mitted to shuffle off his responsibility by the disingenous plea of want of purity of contract. The promise enures to the benefit of third persons taking bills upon the faith of it, within a reasonable time after the promise is made, and such third persons, in the language of Lord Mansfield, "have nothing to do with the equitable circumstances between the drawer and acceptor." The plaintiffs refer, in support of these propositions, to the following authorities: Pillans vs. Van Microp, Burrow's Reports, 1663; Johnson vs. Collings, 1 East, 99; Clark vs. Cock, 4 East, 68; Milne vs. Pust, 3 Campbell, 393; Mason vs. Hunt, Douglas, 296; M'Kim vs. Smith, 1 Hall's Law Journal, 485; Pauson vs. Coolidge, 2 Gallison, 235; Banorgee vs. Hovey, 5 Massachusetts Reports, 15; Wilson vs. Clements, 3 Massachusetts Reports, 1; Parker vs. Grule, 2 Wendell, 545; Same case, 5 Wendell, 414.

- 2. This doctrine is founded upon important considerations of commercial policy and mercantile convenience, and for half a century, the commercial world have confidently acted As was observed by Justice Grose, "we should be doing great mischief if we were to overturn this doctrine."
- 3. The defendants' counsel has attempted to restrict the doctrine to cases where the letter of credit so describes the particular bills to be drawn as to identify them. Such a position is palpably hostile to that principle of "mercantile convenience" which, as already stated, lies at the foundation of the general doctrine of the availability of a letter of credit, in favor of third persons. The idea seems to have been taken entirely from the case of Coolidge vs. Payson; when the Supreme Court of the United States, having no occasion to go beyond the case of a bill identified by the letter, limited themselves to such a case; and if, by implication, their decision can be considered as pregnant with the negative, that if not specially identified the drawer would not be bound, it must be regarded, at all events, as obiter dictum. In the case in

Wendell, decided at a much later period, we find no identifi- EASTERN DIST. cation, but rather the reverse, for the promise pointed to two December, 1840. bills at three and four months, yet a single bill for the whole amount, at four months, was considered as covered by the promise. It is, moreover, a principle of universal law, that TAYLEUR ET AL the intent of the parties is the true key to the construction of every instrument, be it a sale, a bond, a will, or, as in this case, a letter of credit. This letter was couched in the most general terms. They avoided the enumeration of specific sums, to be drawn at specific dates, in favor of specific persons, because the object was to give Grimshaw a general credit up to ten thousand pounds, &c., for any business that he might It was intended for the perusal of third see fit to engage in. persons, and to induce them to give credit to Grimshaw. is patent upon the face of the letter itself, and flows also irresistibly from the expressions of Grimshaw's application, to which the letter of credit was a reply.

4. The letter gave a continuing open credit. The terms of the letter, coupled especially with the application of Grimshaw, are conclusive upon this point.

5. The Carrolton Bank took the bills upon the faith of the letter of credit, which was deposited with them, and has so This is undisputed, as to the bills of later date. As to the first bill, it appears it was received, together with the letter of credit, by the Exchange Committee, on the 23d That by a by-law of the corporation, the Exchange Committee were without power to act upon a letter of credit. That they could only be accepted by the Board of Directors. That on the 26th April, the board accepted the letter of credit, and ratified the action of the Exchange Committee. ratification, by a retroactive effect, made the act of the Exchange Committee the act of the Board: See 2 Strange, 1128. where it was held as follows: If a continual claim, or an entry to avoid a fine, or an entry for condition broken, is made by a person having no present authority, the principal may bring an action upon any of these acts, and his ratification or adoption of them will supply the want of an original authority. In Roe vs. Pierce, 2 Campbell, 96, a verbal notice to guit.

CARROLLTON

CARROLLTON BANK 738.

EASTERN DIST. by a steward of a corporation, was held ratified and binding, December, 1840. by the corporation's bringing a suit founded upon that notice: See, also Goodlitle vs. Woodward, 3 B. & A., 689. posing the ratification of the board would not so retroact, yet TAYLEUR ET AL. another position will support us. If the title of the bill was divested on the 23d April, in whom did it vest? If in the bank, its accessory, the right arising from the letter of credit, vested also, for the letter accompanied the bill. But was it vested in the two directors? Still, as the letter accompanied the bill, the accessory right of acceptance vested in them Then, when on the 26th the board adopted this act, clearly by the principle of subrogation, they took all the rights which the directors had acquired.

6. The plaintiffs contend that the fate of every bill of Grimshaw, properly chargeable to the letter of credit, was, as regards the condition contained in the letter of credit, to be decided by the actual amount of the defendants' acceptance, as compared with the actual value on hand, at the moment of presentment for acceptance. As each bill came forward, the inquiry was, are you at this moment under acceptance by an amount exceeding by ten thousand pounds the amount of value (that is merchandise or proceeds of merchandise) now on hand? If you are not, your letter of credit entitles me to acceptance; and if you refuse, you dishonor your own promise, your implied acceptance. If you are so in advance, then you have the right to refuse acceptance of the bill I now present to you. This is the only fair and reasonable stand-It accords with the phraseology of the letter and the intent of the defendants. It is simple, unequivocal and certain.

Benjamin, for the defendants, contended, the plaintiffs are not a party to the letter of credit, and do not even allege an assignment of Grimshaw's rights, but merely claim, that the letter was exhibited and deposited with them by Grimshaw. Even if they were his assignees, they could not recover, for the only action that Grimshaw could maintain, would be one for damages for a breach of contract, which is not the one

now brought; and which could be victoriously defended by EASTERN DIST. a plea of compensation, if on no other ground, for the evi- December, 1840. dence shows that he is indebted to them for more than ten thousand pounds.

- 2. The second ground of defence involves a question of TAYLEUR ET AL. commercial law of great importance, which, however, is now pretty well settled, by the decisions in England and America; and which is, "whether a general letter of credit addressed to an individual, authorizing the drawing of bills by him, up to a certain amount, but without any description by which the bills so drawn could be identified, be such an acceptance of the future bills, as to authorize suit against the signers of the letter, by third persons, purchasers of the bills; and to whom the letter was exhibited at the time of purchase?" We contend, that in order to construe a promise to accept a future bill into an actual acceptance, the bill must be described in terms not to be mistaken; the description must be such as to identify the particular bill sued on: Chitty, on Bills, (Ed. 1839,) pages 311-12-13; Bayley, on Bills, (Ed. 1836,) p. 168; 3 Burrows, 1663; 3 East, 105; 4 Idem., 70; 4 Campbell, 393; Payson vs. Coolidge, 2 Wheaton, 66; 1 Peters, 283; 3 Idem., 426; 1 Baldwin, 38; 2 Wendell, 545; 5 Idem., 414.
- 3. The case before the court is stronger than any in the books in favor of the defendants, for the letter of credit contains a clause, that shows the signers contemplated that they were contracting with Grimshaw exclusively, as they authorize him to draw with the understanding, i. e., "on the condition, that at or before the close of the season, the probable balance against Grimshaw be remitted for." The evidence shows that he is indebted for drafts drawn under the same letter, for a sum exceeding the amount authorized; and the attempt, in this suit, is to impose on the defendants a still further loss.
- 4. The plaintiffs are in a dilemma, from which it seems impossible they can escape. Their whole action is based on the supposition, that the letter of credit in question is equivalent to an actual acceptance of the bills afterwards to be The bills which were accepted supra protest, were

CARROLLTON BANK w.

EASTERN DIST. drawn and presented prior to those held by the plaintiffs. December, 1840. they are right in their positions, the bills thus accepted supra protest were, by virtue of the letter, clearly accepted uncon-The subsequent protest and acceptance supra ditionally. TAYLEDE ET AL protest, are perfectly idle; because it is palpable that the drawee, after an unconditional acceptance, cannot accept for honor: See 1 Peters, 264, where chief justice Marshall says, "If the drawees, refusing to honor a bill, were bound in good faith to accept or pay as drawees, they can acquire no rights by paying supra protest."

Morphy, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendants, residing in Liverpool, are sued for a balance on four bills of exchange, drawn on them by James Grimshaw, drawn to the order of and endorsed by U. Bouligny. The plaintiffs allege, that they were induced, shortly after the date and before the maturity of said bills, to purchase and negotiate them upon the faith of a certain letter of credit given to Grimshaw by defendants, exhibited to and deposited with them at the time of such purchase and nogotiation; that defendants were bound, under the faith and virtue of said letter of credit, to accept and pay the said bills, but that they refused acceptance and payment of them, although they did afterwards pay certain sums on account of the same; that they, (the plaintiffs,) have been obliged to pay and take up these bills, which they had negotiated to third persons, together with damages, interest and charges, and that by virtue of said letter of credit, defendants have become bound and liable unto them for the balance due on said four bills, and for damages and interest thereon.

The defendants answer, that on the 7th December, 1838, they did by letter addressed to James Grimshaw, give him an open credit for ten thousand pounds sterling, available as often as his bills drawn on said credit should be covered by satisfactory remittances in bills, specie or produce, so that the defendants should not at any time be brought under acceptance for more than ten thousand pounds sterling beyond the value they

might have on hand, and with the understanding that at, or EASTERN DIST. before the close of the season, the probable balance against December, 1840. him, should be remitted for; that they have faithfully complied with all their obligations entered into with the said Grimshaw; that at the time when plaintiffs' bill's were dishonored, TAYLEUR ET AL. defendants were already under acceptance for a sum exceeding ten thousand pounds sterling beyond the value they then had on hand on account of said Grimshaw, and consequently were not bound to accept them. They conclude, by calling for strict proof that plaintiffs did take these bills on the faith of said letter of credit. Upon these pleadings and the evidence adduced under them, there was a judgment below for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.

The letter upon which the defendants are sought to be made liable as acceptors of the bills sued on, is in the following words, to wit:

"Liverpool, 7th December, 1838."

"James Grimshaw, Esq., New-Orleans."

"Dear Sir .-- We have received your letter of the 16th of November, advising your safe arrival at New-York."

"We annul the open credit we before gave you for ten thousand pounds, which you did not think sufficiently explicit, and in lieu thereof, we now give you an open credit for ten thousand pounds sterling, available as often as your drafts drawn on said credit shall be covered by satisfactory remittances in bills, specie or produce, so that we be not at any time brought under acceptances for more than ten thousand pounds beyond the value we have on hand on said account; and with the understanding, that at or before the close of the season, the probable balance against you shall be remitted for. We hope this will be sufficient to enable you to do any business to this port which may be likely to turn out to your advantage."

"We are, dear Sir, yours truly,

(Signed) Charles Tayleur, Sons & Co."

It is contended, on the part of the appellants, that when one merchant makes to another such a promise to accept, as that contained in the foregoing letter, it amounts to an ac-

CARROLLTON BANK 738.

EASTERN DIST. ceptance, and inures to the benefit of third persons, taking December, 1840. bills upon the faith of it, within a reasonable time after the It is further contended, that although such promise is made. a promise to accept be conditional, and though a third per-TATLEUR ET AL. son takes the bills, subject to the condition, yet, if the condition be fulfilled, the implied acceptance is as absolute as though never coupled with a condition. In support of these positions, the counsel for the appellants has cited a number of respectable authorities, both English and American. contract of the defendants was made in England, and the bills were to be made payable there, although drawn in Louisiana; they were drawn, so far as respects the defendants, with a view to England; for the execution of the contract it should seem, therefore, that their liability should be tested by the laws of that country, but it is a matter of no moment, whether our laws or those of Great Britain are applied, for the Law Merchant of the two countries, is not materially variant on this subject; if there be a difference, we believe that the doctrine of implied acceptances has been carried further in America. In England, it was for some time a matter of doubt, whether a promise to accept a bill not in esse, could be received as an acceptance; subsequent adjudications seem, however, to have done away with the old distinction between bills drawn before and bills drawn after secept, contem- the date of the promise to accept, but in all the adjudged bill or bills, cases to which we have been referred, the promise to accept contemplates a specific bill or bills, whether drawn or to be drawn, and no where do we find a general authority to draw draw to a certain to a certain amount without any description by which the bills drawn can be identified, construed into such an acceptof the bills. In ance of the future bills drawn under it, as to authorize suit will not be such against the drawee by third persons. We see, on the conan implica acceptance or pro- trary, most of the judges in England expressing the regret. mise to accept, as that any other act than a written acceptance on the bill itself. has ever been deemed an acceptance. After many decisions in both countries on these collateral acceptances, predicated on the facts of each particular case, the rule has been laid down and settled by the Supreme Court of the United States.

A promise to plates a specific whether drawn or to be drawn, and not a general authority to amount without any description the latter case, it an implied sowill bind the drawee.

in Coolidge vs. Payson, 2 Wheaton 75, it is, "that a letter EASTERN DIST.

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written within a reasonable time, before or after the date of December, 1840. a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken. and promising to accept it, is, if shown to the person who afterwards takes the bill on the credit of the letter, a virtual FAYLEUR ET AL. acceptance, binding the person who makes the promise." But this is said by the counsel to be an obiter dictum of the credit, within a judge, who on that occasion was the organ of the court. We beforeorafter the believe, on the contrary, as in fact is expressed in the opinion date of the bill, itself, that this question being considered of much impor- promising to accept it, if shown tance to merchants, it was intended to be put at rest, hence to a person who the remarkable precision with which the rule was laid down. takes the bill on the faith of the This question received again the particular attention of the letter, is a virtual same tribunal in Schimmelpennick et al. vs. Bayard et al., 1 Peters, 284; and in Boyce & Henry vs. Edwards, 4 Peters 118, the same rule was again laid down and sanctioned. In speaking of these collateral acceptances, as recognized by frequent decisions in England, justice Lawrence is said to have remarked, "we should be doing great mischief, if we were to overturn this doctrine." It is the opinion of this court, that the mischief would be still greater, were we to carry it to the length we are called upon to do in the present The injurious effects which would flow from such an indefinite extention of the doctrine, would not be counterbalanced by the pretended mercantile convenience, in which it is said to have originated. When a general authority to draw is given, without any description of the bills to be drawn, the drawee is without the means of distinguishing those which are taken on the credit of his promise from those which are not, and even when the bills have been described, there is still some danger, for the purchaser must take the risk of the bad faith of the drawer, who may have previously

drawn in favor of another person. The rule then, even as laid down, is not free from objection, but such as it is, we are disposed to hold to it, strictly, the purchaser of a bill, who seeks to charge a drawee as acceptor upon a collateral or implied undertaking. 3 Burrows, 1663; 1 East, 105; 4 Idem., 70; 4 Campbell, 393; 2 Wendell, 545; 5 Idem., 414; 3 Peters,

CARROLLTON

BANK

So a letter of

EASTERN DIS December, 1840. 426; Chitty's Ed. of 1839, p. 311-12-13; Bayley Ed. of 1836, p. 168.

CABRULLTON BANK 738.

If no action can be maintained on these bills, under the doctrine of implied acceptances, although carried, perhaps, TAYLEUR ET AL. beyond the proper boundary as remarked by Lord Kenyon, it is difficult to perceive on what principle of law the plaintiffs can sue for the breach of a promise not made to them. No communication is alleged to have passed between them and defendants at the time of their taking these bills. If defendants have broken their promise, they are liable in damages to Grimshaw, but clearly not to every purchaser of his bills, with or without communication of defendant's engagement or promise to him. Grimshaw, in one of his letters, states to defendants in relation to this letter of credit, "it does not enable me to sell in bank. The banks require all letters of credit on

But where bills person, on a letcertain condi-

persons who adter, ' and have nothing to do

are drawn and which they act, to be addressed to themselves, &c.;" and requests sold to a third the defendants to send him several credits in blank, which ter of the drawee might be filled up in favor of particular banks; this the defendwritten to the drawer, allowing ants refused to do. It is to be regretted that the simple and, the latter a liminate in our opinion, only safe course alluded to by Grimshaw, is on not always followed. When a letter of credit is thus adtions, the drawee dressed to the person or bank who advances funds on the bills is under no ob-ligation, express drawn under it, the latter becomes the mandatory of the or implied, to signer of the letter, and has nothing to do with the equitable the holders, to accept the bills. circumstances between the drawer and drawee. The plain-Letters of credit should be additional tiffs do not allege or show any assignment of Grimshaw's dressed to the rights under this letter of credit, nor does any transfer of them vance the funds result from the sale of these bills or the deposit of the letter; or buy the bills even were the plaintiffs allowed to avail themselves of the them, and then rights of the promisee, it would not assist them in any degree, mandate- for the evidence shows him to be indebted to the defendants. rics of the in a sum far exceeding the amount sued for.

The opinion just expressed on the plaintiffs' right of action. with the equities supersedes the necessity of examining the other points in or relations be-tween the draw- this case, which have been so elaborately and ably argued er and drawee. before us.

> It is, therefore, ordered, that the judgment of the Parish Court be affirmed, with costs.



